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TAB 1

Recommendation: "The Directors of Personnel and Training together with representatives from operating components take a fresh look at the overall problem of clerical usage and make recommendations for a more effective system. This should be followed by an OTR reassessment of the clerical training program."

Concur. While within the DD/S area there is mixed reaction as to the degree of need for such a re-examination, it is agreed that it will be beneficial.

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TAB 3

Recommendation: "DTR adopt a three-year tour of duty as standard practice for instructors and schedule replacement at the rate of one-third of the instructor staff annually. (Primarily OS/TR)"

Concur. I agree with the Director of Training, however, that he must continue to make allowances for individual exceptions as to the length of tour of duty. The length of the individual tour is not as important as assurance of a planned, staggered turnover of instructor personnel.

Execution of such a planned rotation will call for wholehearted cooperation by the Components with the Office of Training in effecting a periodic exchange of personnel for rotational tours of duty.

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would be well not to overstate the present capabilities of this Branch. The Branch is functioning very effectively and producing at top capacity. Only by enlarging its T/O and by assigning additional, qualified personnel capable of a high standard of individual work can its functions and scope be expanded. At the same time, actions have been and are being taken to ensure that operating branches of the Clandestine Services are fully cognizant of the nature and scope of services available."

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TAB 5

Recommendation: "Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, collaborate with Chief, Operations School/OTR, to develop and publicize a working collection of open intelligence literature which will fully reflect the existence and capabilities of the principal collection at headquarters."

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The Director of Training, through the Chief, Operations School, OTR, has initiated action necessary to carry out the intent of this recommendation.

It might be noted here that OCR has been most cooperative in endeavoring to see to it that its Library is responsive to current training needs. OTR can offer nothing but praise in this regard.

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TAB 6

Recommendation: "DTR experiment with the concept of a board of overseers composed of senior grade professional officers as a means to improved communication with and indoctrination of consumers, and to promote the development of more effective policies on curriculum and enrollment."

While the Director of Training and I both are willing to experiment with the concept of a board of overseers, we are not convinced that such a board is necessary. We shall be interested in learning the views of the DD/P and DD/I.

I believe, of course, that training policies and programs form an essential and inseparable part of the Agency personnel development program, including mid-career and senior officer development. The Director of Personnel has recently proposed that the Career Council be responsible for the total Agency personnel development program, and that the efforts of the Office of Training and the Office of Personnel toward the single objective be united under the aegis of the Career Council. Because the forthcoming Career Development Board may be a mechanism by which the Career Council ensures that training

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policies and programs are incorporated in the total development program, the Council has deferred activation of the Board as it was originally conceived. The Director of Training and the Director of Personnel believe that their programs can be effectively integrated and implemented through the functioning of the Career Development Board. They agree, for example, to alternate the chairmanship of the Board between them in accordance with the nature of matters before the Board. This type of arrangement to blend the efforts of these two support offices under the aegis of the Career Council is, in my opinion, an example of realistic planning for Agency use of the Director of Training and his resources.

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TAB 7

Recommendation: "The DD/P establish in his office a position of DD/P Training and Doctrine Officer having responsibility and authority for the formulation and implementation of clandestine Service training policy and the development of operational doctrine."

I understand that the DD/P already has taken steps in this direction by appointing a full-time DD/P Training Officer. The Director of Training has indicated to me that he is fully in accord with this recommendation. The latter urges also that the DD/P Training Officer be supported by qualified, senior operations or intelligence officers designated as training officers in the several staffs and operating divisions.

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TAB 8

RECOMMENDATION: "DD/P take appropriate steps to ensure that DTR be made a participant, through the presence of his representative or through other effective form of consultation, in all long-range planning for the

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Concur.

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TAB 10

Recommendation: "The courses on International Communism be given wider publicity and offered to the personnel of other agencies."

I believe that this action may not be necessary. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of a memorandum from the Director of Training to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 26 May 1956, subject: Establishment of School of International Communism, selected members of the SIC instructional staff already carry a heavy schedule of training for personnel of other Government agencies. Over half of the training accomplished by SIC is non-CIA staff. They participate regularly in courses at the Foreign Service Institute, Strategic Intelligence School, Naval Intelligence School, the Air University, and others. Any appreciable, additional workload will necessitate an expansion of the SIC staff. In view of the constant pressure to reduce headquarters personnel strength, which is very likely to continue, I do not believe that it would be appropriate for us to seek authorization for new positions and personnel nor do I believe that we should devote more than fifty per cent of the SIC effort to non-CIA staff training.

TAB 11

Recommendation: "The DD/P instruct all supervisors to observe, in requesting language training, the principle that training in regular classes is the normal and most effective method, and that resort to tutorial training shall be had only in exceptional cases and where required by security considerations, unavoidable pressure of time, or other valid reason."

Concur.

TAB 12

Recommendation: "DCI issue instructions that Agency Regulations be amended by adding new provisions (a) directing the Deputy Directors to identify the categories of employees for whom specified degrees of language proficiency are required and to tie these standards of proficiency into promotion practices, and (b) directing the Deputy Directors to identify those positions, or that proportion of positions, in each overseas station that may be filled only by individuals who possess, to the degree specified, the language commonly used in the general area of that station."

Concur.

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TAB 13

Recommendation: "DCI issue instructions that Agency Regulations be further amended to make language proficiency testing, according to Agency standards, mandatory for all employees who are required to have language skill."

Concur.

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TAB 14

Recommendation: "DD/P direct that in all long-range operational planning the implications with respect to possible radical change in requirements as to the nature or extent of language capabilities be carefully considered and that the conclusions reached be regularly and promptly communicated to the DTR."

Concur.

TAB 15

Recommendation: "DD/P give clearer recognition to the necessity for developing in larger numbers than at the present rate linguistically qualified area specialists."

Concur.

TAB 16

Recommendation: "The Deputy Directors take such measures as may be necessary to cause all staff employees under their jurisdiction who claim language competence to submit to the Office of Training tests at the earliest practicable moment."

Concur.

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TAB 17

Recommendation: "DD/P consider the advisability of placing directly on the division chiefs the responsibility for all scheduling of language training for personnel in the division and for monitoring the timely carrying out of the language training thus scheduled."

Concur.

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TAB 18

Recommendation: "The DD/P, as well as the DD/I and DD/S, strongly recommend to their division chiefs, assistant directors and other senior officers that they familiarize themselves, through attendance thereat, with the contents of the Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness course."

While I strongly concur in the objective and intent of this recommendation, I feel that it may prove difficult for senior officers at this level actually to attend the course. As the Inspector General has stated, however, two groups of representative, senior officers already have attended the Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness course and have reported it to be useful and valuable. We believe it to be particularly pertinent to officers who have had Agency experience and who have or are assuming supervisory responsibilities.

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The Director of Security especially endorses training in overseas effectiveness because of the definite security implications of personal adjustment and behavior overseas--not to mention operational factors--and for this reason alone, attendance of this type of orientation and indoctrination should be very strongly encouraged or even made mandatory.

Further, the Office of Training is looking into the utility of adopting lessons from the behavioral sciences into tradecraft (operational) training. It also is studying the problem of overseas effectiveness training for deep cover, U. S. personnel.

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TAB 19

Recommendation: "The DCI establish as Agency policy that all junior professional officers enter Agency employ through the JOTP."

I am in complete sympathy with the apparent objective of promoting the concept of the professional Intelligence Officer and of achieving higher, more comprehensive standards of training for all Agency professionals. As every DD/S Staff and Office Chief has been quick to point out, however, CIA employs a very wide variety of "professionals," both generalists and specialists of many kinds, and the Agency recruits them both as juniors and as more experienced, senior personnel. Their requirements for orientation and training, and their need-to-know, must vary accordingly.

We believe, therefore, that for the foreseeable future we should continue to employ JOT's and specialists through separate procedures. I do strongly recommend, however, that wherever feasible, our new professionals should be trained together in the JOT orientation and familiarization courses and in such other JOT basic training courses in which their needs are compatible.

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TAB 20

Recommendation: "The DTR establish a JOT Selection Panel composed of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates together with appropriate representation from the Office of Personnel and Training. The Chief/JOTP should chair the panel."

I agree with the principle that the Deputy Directorates, through representation, should play a role in the selection of JOT's. I do not, however, believe that it is necessary to establish another, separate, JOT Selection Panel for this purpose. Rather, I would strongly prefer to have thoughtfully selected, experienced representatives of the DD/P, DD/I and DD/S serve rotational tours of duty as training officers on the JOTP staff. Here, as I have set forth in my introductory remarks, these officers can most effectively participate in the JOT selection and placement processes.

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TAB 21

Recommendation: "The DTR should give consideration to the feasibility of the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection process recommended above."

I cannot concur in this recommendation. May I suggest, however, that selected university consultants do serve the intended purpose, not sitting as a panel to judge individual applicants, but rather providing their viewpoint to broad problems of spotting, selection, recruitment, means of attracting desirable candidates, and so forth. Where this is appropriate, the consultants can and do offer constructive criticism and suggestions for the improvement of JOT orientation and training, particularly in those fields which are not exclusively CIA or "intelligence" in nature.

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TAB 22

Recommendation: "The DTR arrange for the participation on a rotational basis of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates in JOTP placement panels."

Concur, but I believe that this can be accomplished most effectively and efficiently by Deputy Directorate representation on the JOTP Staff, on a rotational assignment basis, as proposed in Tab 20.

TAB 23

Recommendation: "The DTR together with the Director of Personnel take steps to eliminate prejudices that have arisen which tend to assign second class status to DD/S and DD/I careers."

I do, of course, concur in the need to see to it that the bases for such prejudices are eliminated. The Directors of Training and of Personnel will work together to this end.

It is a long established policy that the JOT's be given a clear, accurate, and unbiased picture of the Agency's mission, organization, and functions and of the mutual interdependence of its parts. But JOT's will form their own preferences regardless of any action we can take, and most JOT's possess a natural preference for service overseas.

One possible source of the prejudice cited by the Inspector General is the fact that most JOT's are to be assigned to one major component. Since only small minorities are to be assigned to the two other major components, and since there is no indication whatsoever of advantages or "eliteness" in being selected for a minority group, there is a natural

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crowd or group tendency to consider the majority group as more important to the Agency. If more JOT's were utilized by DD/I and DD/S, it is believed that this prejudice among the JOT's would probably not come into being. To this end, a more intense effort will be made in the future to select JOT's for careers in DD/I and DD/S.

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TAB 24

Recommendation: "The DD/P establish minimum standards of training and experience for case officer apprenticeship including general preparatory, basic skills, language and advanced operational training, and that he determine the feasibility by experiment of some form of overseas familiarization as a part of the apprenticeship period."

Concur. The DD/S, particularly OTR, will be glad to assist.

In connection with basic training and with advanced and specialized courses, there has been reflected a mixed opinion as to the length and scheduling of certain courses, as well as to the content and effectiveness of training. Unfortunately, criticism and suggestions for change are not always brought to the attention of the Director of Training so that he may undertake appropriate review and action. It should be understood that all training--and here I am speaking primarily of all OTR-conducted training--is conducted in response to stated requirements from the Deputy Directorates, one or several. And even when a course is proposed by OTR on the initiative of the Director of Training, its content,

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length, proposed scheduling (not only dates but full or part-time scheduling) are coordinated with the Directorate whose needs are to be fulfilled. The successful planning and conduct of OTR training is, in fact, a joint effort calling for the continuing interest, participation, and support of the trainees' sponsors--not simply of the Directorates, but the Offices and Divisions. The Director of Training can control by himself the methods and techniques of instruction, but he must rely on the consumers for feedback on the total effectiveness of training, including doctrine.

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TAB 25

Recommendation: "The DTR together with the Director of Personnel undertake to monitor the present efforts of the Department of State to improve personnel management and training in the Foreign Service for measures that may be adopted for the Agency's benefit."

Concur. We have been doing this for some time, on a continuing basis.

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TAB 26

Recommendation: "The DD/I direct that the recruitment and initial training of junior analysts be accomplished through the JOTP; that increased emphasis be placed by the Agency's recruitment facility on the recruitment of JOT's with academic backgrounds suited to DD/I needs; that ORR and other specialists recruitment be phased down as production of JOT's increases and generally limited to senior analysts at the Ph.D. level."

Concur, with allowance made for recruitment of specialists who need not necessarily meet JOTP standards but whose peculiar knowledge and skills are essential to the DD/I. (Please refer also to TAB 19.)

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TAB 27

Recommendation: "The DD/I and the DD/P initiate a test program for the rotation of qualified DD/I professionals to the DD/P to serve as reports officers with part of the tour to be spent overseas, DD/P reports officers in turn to rotate to the DD/I for training and experience in the evaluation and use of intelligence reporting. (A similar recommendation was made in the IG's survey of the Far East Division, DD/P, dated June 1958. The lack of recognizable progress in this important effort impels us to repeat the recommendation here.)"

Concur, with the hope that this will not interfere with rotation of OTR instructors to the DD/P, or DD/I.

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TAB 28

Recommendation: "Advanced external training for analysts be phased somewhat later in the career pattern, perhaps after the fifth year of duty, to permit maximum play of JOTP and other intelligence preparation during the apprenticeship period."

Concur.

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TAB 29

Recommendation: "The DTR be specifically charged with the responsibility of determining under whose auspices non-OTR training will be conducted and pertinent Agency regulations be amended accordingly."

Concur.

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TAB 30

Recommendation: "DTR review the training records of employees in professional categories who resigned from the Agency during FY 1960, or longer if necessary, to determine if a more definitive policy governing external training is required."

Concur.

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TAB 31

Recommendation: "The DCI authorize the establishment of senior grade positions for selected Training Officers at the Assistant Director or DD/P Division Chief level with job qualifications designed to ensure the effective performance of proper training functions."

Concur.

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TAB 32

Recommendation: "The DTR initiate an amendment of which more clearly describes his responsibility to render only advice, guidance and support to the on-the-job training effort."

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TAB 33

Recommendation: "The DD/P study the extent to which it is feasible to develop a greater capability in technical trade-craft operations officers, establish minimum standards of technical training as basic to the required preparation of all operations officers and issue policy accordingly for the guidance of the Technical School TSD."

No comment.

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TAB 34

Recommendation: "The DCI authorize and direct the establishment of a mid-career training course for officers at the GS-12 and -13 level in order to prepare them for broader responsibilities particularly in the field of command, to refresh their motivation in the intelligence service and to broaden their understanding of the interrelationship of Agency functions."

Concur. OTR has done some preliminary research and planning for such a course and, in fact, already offers some training in separate, functional courses at this level, such as management and overseas effectiveness training. The Director of Training has been reluctant to push a mid-career course, however, while training is still approached on a permissive basis.

The majority of Office and Staff heads of DD/S have signified their agreement with the need and utility of a mid-career course as envisioned by the IG. If the other Deputy Directorates show a similar interest, and if this course shall be attended on a "planned" basis, I shall request OTR to move ahead with their planning.

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I should like to pause here to comment briefly on the present state of management training. OTR now offers three separate scheduled courses in management and supervision, arranged by student grade levels, plus a new senior seminar in management for selected, senior officers of the Agency. In addition, numbers of Agency personnel, especially from the DD/S, have completed external management training of various types in such institutions as the Harvard Business School, University of Chicago, American Management Association, the U. S. Army Management School, the Brookings Institution, and others. We have now reached the point where we can relate the various management training facilities to the varying needs of our employees, and I foresee that we shall continue to take appropriate advantage of these several opportunities.

Nevertheless, I agree that Agency doctrine and problems of command, management, personnel administration, and supervision should be given due weight in the proposed mid-career course.

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TAB 35

Recommendation: "The DCI authorize and direct that a senior officer program be established to develop more officers capable of formulating and evaluating comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in the U. S. Government generally in keeping with the outline described in the IG survey."

I concur that the Agency will benefit from a senior officer training program, but I believe that we must give this recommendation careful and deliberate study. I am not at all sure that we should try to set up a "CIA Senior Officer Course" comparable to that offered at the National War College, for example. First of all, such an undertaking cannot help but be very expensive to administer and to operate, and OTR advises that it does not now have the staff or the facilities for such a course.

The Director of Training points out, too, that OTR already is making very extensive use of the valuable services and time of many of our senior and top-level CIA officials as guest speakers and panelists in existing courses. Finally, we are already accomplishing a considerable amount of training of CIA senior officers at this level in

a. the senior officer colleges of Defense and State,

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b. civilian and military graduate schools of management,

c. advanced studies in other subject matter areas in colleges and universities in the United States and overseas (especially by DD/I officers), and last

d. our own, existing senior officer-level courses.

I feel that we can do more in this area, and am confident that there can be worked out a comprehensive program which will meet the general needs of senior executives as well as the peculiar needs of our senior professional specialists.

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